Brexit and the sad death of the UK’s industrial strategy by Wormald, John
Brexit and the sad death of the UK’s 
industrial strategy 
By John Wormald, Managing Partner of Autopolis Strategy 
Consultants 
On 9 March 2021, Helen Thomas published an opinion piece in the 
Financial Times, entitled, “Wanted: a long-term strategy for UK 
business”. Her piece began, “Does the UK still have an industrial 
strategy?”. The 256-page white paper, to which she referred, entitled 
“Industrial Strategy, Building a Britain Fit for the Future”, is a vast and 
ambitious array of concepts, ideas, themes and projects. It was a 
laudable endeavour, with both flaws and inevitable limitations. I have 
four main criticisms: 
1. Political overlay. The first foreword from the then prime minister, 
Theresa May. sets a bombastic and boosterish tone for the whole 
document. It also establishes a most unfortunate boundary condition, 
that of treating Brexit as an objective in its own right. And here we 
have the fundamental failing undermining the whole exercice: it 
should have been conducted before any decision on leaving the EU 
but have included a critical assessment of the benefits and costs of 
membership upon each sector of the economy. The second foreword, 
from Greg Clark, Secretary of State for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy, responsible for the report, in fact almost laments 
this: “To benefit from the opportunities before us, we need to prepare 
to seize them. This would be needed at any time, and Britain’s 
decision to leave the European Union makes it even more important.” 
The very last paragraph, at the end of the last section, “Conclusion – 
Britain and the World”, presents a heroic assumption, that the UK 
would achieve a rational Brexit and a harmonious future relationship 
with the EU Alas, we now know the reality of the very poor deal that 
has been reached and of the antagonistic attitude being taken 
towards the EU. 
2. Over-ambition. The attempt to examine the UK’s situation and 
prospects sector by sector was meritorious. This approach surely 
reflects Greg Clark’s early experience at Boston Consulting Group. 
Developing a strategy for a multi-business corporation is a big job, 
usually involving several states. Attempting this for a national 
economy is hugely more complicated still. This white paper does 
identify some promising priority areas for development. But it is too 
much tinged with sloganeering in its Five Challenges: “the world’s 
most innovative economy”, “good jobs and greater earning power for 
all”, “a major upgrade to the UK’s infrastructure”, “the best place to 
start and grow a business”, and “prosperous communities across the 
UK”. The four Grand Challenges flag four braod areas of future 
opportunity: “Put the UK at the forefront of the AI and data revolution”, 
“Maximise the advantages for UK industry of the global shift to clean 
growth”, “Become a world leader in shaping the future of mobility”, 
and “Harness the power of innovation to help meet the needs of an 
ageing society”. It might have been better to stop there and seek 
consensus on the priorities before proceeding further. 
3. The analysis. There are far too many words and far too few 
numbers. There is virtually no description of market structures and 
trends within specific sectors, or – most particularly – of the 
competitive positions of British and other enterprises within them. 
However, the need for this in proposals for government support to 
individual sectors is recognized – future work. The use of evidence is 
poor, as though the authors did not understand it, and sometimes 
seemingly tinged with propaganda. As an example of the former, the 
report gloats over an exhibit comparing the 14 largest recipients of 
Foreign Direct Investment in 2007 and 2017, 
with the UK receiving the second largest amount after the US in both 
years. FDI largely reflects the sales of capital assets to foreigners to 
help compensate for those two countries’ huge trade deficits, and not 
necessarily investments in new production capacity. Hilariously, the 
seventh ranked country is the British Virgin Islands and the 10th 
ranked the Cayman Islands. Investment ? Of the latter, trotting out 
HS-2, regarded by many as a pure prestige project, with no attempt to 
address the admittedly very thorny issue of reducing the demand for 
physical mobility.The claim that “the UK is already a world leader in 
AI” may be valid but far more analysis of sub-sector structures and 
trends is needed to base a strategy for the UK in that sector. The 
report does address the UK’s long-standing disconnect – which is 
explicitly addressed elsewhere in the report – between scientific 
excellence and lack of commercial exploitation. The proposal to 
create more PhD and MSc candidacies is but a part solution. There is 
a general proposal for a vast increase in the UK’s lamentably low 
investment in R&D. But where are the businesses that are able and 
willing to invest in these new technologies ? Nothing is said about 
excessive attention paid to finance and financial results, or to the 
general unwillingness to invest. You can lead a horse to water … The 
compositional factor in low national productivity – the very long tail of 
underinvested medium and small businesses – is identified. Yet the 
high level of employment, facilitated by flexible (if not downright weak) 
social legislation is singled out for praise. This reflects a historical 
policy choice – conscious or unconscious – to prefer more jobs, even 
if low-paying. What the UK needs is a leavening of good-quality jobs 
in durably competitive firms, preferably with export potential. There is 
no examination of the Mittelstand, that powerhouse of the German 
economy, exports and regions. The balance of trade is nowhere 
mentioned. How is investment in AI or HS-2 going to lift Hartlepool ? 
4. Brexit. I have previously discussed its likely impact upon the sector 
I know, the automotive industry. “The transition to ultra-low emission 
and CAV presents an opportunity to maximise the economic benefits 
to the UK supply chain.” This obviously needs far more development. 
Simply banning the sale of new ICE-powered vehicles from 2030 is no 
coherent policy. “The close partnership of the government and the 
industry has already led to significant improvements in the 
competitiveness of the UK supply chain in recent years, increasing the 
level of UK content in nationally produced vehicles from 36 per cent in 
2011 to 44 per cent in 2016. Building on this, we are committing to 
rolling out an industry-led supplier improvement programme that will 
target areas where businesses need to improve to match the best in 
Europe. The programme …. will support the sectoral ambition to 
increase the level of UK content in nationally produced vehicles to 50 
per cent by 2022.” This was one sector in which incoherent ad-hocery 
actually was replaced by a consistent and sustained policy, leading to 
the revival of the automotive industry in the UK, through the Japanese 
transplants and Tata’s investment in JLR. All that effort is now likely to 
be up-ended by the lamentable EU trade deal, and the completely 
unnecessary introduction of new barriers to trade in a trans-nationally 
tightly-integrated sector that runs on just-in-time. 
The Industrial Strategy initiative has now been unceremoniously 
dumped. Pursuit of the romantic illusion of sovereignty has swept 
away a rare attempt at sectoral realism and rational long-term 
planning, in favour of short-term politicking. The heart has won over 
the head. This is tragic. 
 
